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CAVEAT VENDITOR-LIABILITY OF VENDORS
OF FOOD IN PENNSYLVANIA
By
CHARL'ES

L.

CASPER*

I
From the earliest times purveyors of food have been held to the highest
degree of care to see to the wholesomeness of such food. Two early English statutes
forbade the sale of corrupt victuals.' Blackstone says 2 that "in contracts for provisions it is always implied that they are wholesome," and if they are not an action
for damages for deceit will lie. The general common law rule is that where

unwholesome food is sold to human beings the seller will be subjected to responsibility for the consequences. The rule is based on the high regard which the law has
for human life and public health.
Pennsylvania was slow to adopt the general common law rule. The earlier
cases held that there is no implied warranty in sale of goods intended for food and
vendor of food was not answerable in damages for the defective quality thereof
unless he expressly warranted them or was guilty of a fraud.' In 1889 the General
Assembly enacted a statute4 which provided that "In every sale of green, salted,
*Ph.B, Yale 1927, LL.B., Harvard 1930 Member of the Luzerne County Bar. Author of
"Pennsylvania Public Utility Law and Procedure."
151 Hen. III, Stat. 'pillor' et tumbrel', et assis' panis et cervis, and Edw.I, Stat. de pistoribus

et brasiatoribus et alius vitellariis,

23 Comm. 165.
SLawrence v. Yard, 1 W.N.C. 37 (1874); Thomas v. Stocker,

1 W.N.C. 402 (1875); Ryan
v.Ulmer, 108 Pa. 332 (1885); Ulmer v. Ryan, 137 Pa. 309 (1890); Marshall v. Aber, 11 C.C. 570;
1 Dist. 770 (1892); Cannon v. Young, 19 CC 239, 5 Dist. 772 (1896). One early case held
there was an implied warranty of fitness at common law: McNaughton v. Joy, I. W.N.C. 470
(1875). However, it should be observed that in all of these cases the proposition was not
raised in an action against the vendor for injuries because of defective food, but as a defense
in an action for the purchase price.
'Act of May 4, 1889 P.L. 87, entitled "An Act relating to the sales of provisions by description."
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pickled or smoked meats, lard and other atticles of merchandise, used wholly or in
part for food, said goods or merchandise shall correspond in kind and quality with
the description given, either orally or in writing, by the vendor; and in every sale of
such goods or merchandise, unless the parties shall agree otherwise, there shall be
an implied contract or understanding that the goods or merchandise are sound and
fit for household consumption." This statute was construed to impose liability on a
vendor who sold food products to a middleman who purchased not for consumption, but for the purpose of resale, 5 but it was held not to apply to sales of food
not for human consumption.!
In 1915 Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Sales Act.7 Section 158 of that Act
provides as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that
behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality
or fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract to sell or a sale, except as follows:
First. Where a buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known
to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required,
and it appears that the buyer relies on the seller's skill or judgment
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an
implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purposes."
This Act did not repeal the Act of 1889, but while applicable to other commodities, it is also applicable to food products.
In the early 1900's a number of trespass actions were brought in Luzerne
County to recover for injuries resulting from trichinosis contracted from eating
diseased pork. Two of those cases were passed upon by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. In Calani V. Swift & Co.,9 the first-of these cases, the Supreme Court
did not follow the doctrine of the earlier cases, 10 but adopted the general common
law rule that where the sale of food is for immediate consumption, there is an
implied warranty that the food is wholesome and fit for the purpose intended,
irrespective of the seller's knowledge of disease or defects therein, and mentioned
that the rule has been put in statutory form in Pennsylvania by the Act of 1889.11
The Court sustained a verdict against the defendant manufacturer on the theory
This 5Act has been repealed by the Act of May 21, 1943 P.L. 539.
Weiss v. Swift & Co., 36 Pa. Super 376 (1908).
6Fuchs v. Eichenlaub, 16 Dist. 932, 54 Pitts. 376 (1907); O'Connor v. Laehman, 65 Pitts.
590 7(1917).
Act of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543; 69 P.S., Section 1 et seq.
869 P.S., Section 124.
Pa. 52, 95, A. 931, LRA 1917 B. 1272 (1915).
10251
0

See Note 3, Supra.
IlThis case was decided by the Supreme Court on October 4, 1915. The Court did not
refer to section 15 of the Uniform Sales Act which had become effective in Pennsylvania on
May 19, 1915.
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of breach of the implied warranty. In Tavani v. Swiji & Co.,' 2 the trial of the action
resulted in a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. Mr. Justice Fraser, who
had written the opinion in the Catani case, delivered the opinion of the Court
sustaining the verdict on the ground that the action was in trespass for negligence
and not for breach of warranty, and that no negligence on the part of defendant had
been shown. It is difficult to reconcile the reasoning in these cases. If there was a
breach of an implied warranty of fitness in the Catani case, the same breach must
have occurred in the Tavani case. Liability should not be made to depend upon the
theory of the action, but, as Mr. Justice Fraser pointed out in the Catani case, upon
"the demands of social justice".
In Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,'1 plaintiff brought
an action of trespass for injuries sustained from swallowing broken glass contained
in a bottle of carbonated beverage. The Supreme Court sustained a verdict for
plaintiff on the theory that once the presence of the glass was shown in the bottle,
the accident proves its own negligent cause, and the jury would be permitted to
infer negligence." The Court further stated that the particular dereliction of the
defendant need not be shown; the negligent act is demonstrated by showing the
glass in the bottom of the bottle. The Supreme Court laid down the rule that those
engaging in the business of manufacturing food or beverages for consumption must
use a high degree of care to see that the food or beverage is free from foreign or
deleterious substances that injuriously affect the user. All reasonably scientific and
up-to-date methods must be employed to obviate the presence of any injurious substances, but even where such methods are employed and such substances get into
the product and their presence there may be due to carelessness somewhere along
the line, the manufacturer will be 'esponsible to a member of the public injured
thereby. The Court decided the case purely on the theory of negligence, and expressly stated that it did not consider any question of r.presentation or warranty.
In such cases the negligence of defendant is a question for the jury. l 5 Although
a manufacturer owes a duty of reasonable inspection before the commodity is placed
on the market for consumption, the test is whether the circumstances are such as
would satisfy a reasonable and well balanced mind that the accident resulted from
the negligence of the defendant.
In regard to the liability of manufacturers, the Courts have developed what
is known as the "original package rule". A manufacturer who puts on the market
food intended for human consumption in a sealed bottle or original package is held
to represent to each purchaser, even though the purchase is made through a dealer,
12262 Pa. 184, 105 A. 55 (1918).
18296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929).

14Followed in Murphy et al v. Yuengling Dairy Products Corp., 34 D. & C. 355, 6 Sch. Reg.
242 (1938).

16This rule has been consistently followed: Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pgh. 102
Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931); Madden v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 106 Pa. Super, 474, 162 A.
687; (1932) ; Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Pa., 152 Pa. Super. 445, 33 A. 2d 448.
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that the contents thereof are wholesome and suitable for the purpose for which they
are sold.1 6 The rule is based on the fact that since the purchaser cannot examine the
goods for himself, he has the right to rely on the manufacturer and it is only just
and reasonable to hold the manufacturer responsible. But where the food is not
sold in the original package, and plaintiff's evidence failed to exclude tho possibility that the deleterious matter got into the food before the manufacturer came
into possession of it or after it had been sold to the retailer, the manufacturer will
not be liable.17 In order to hold the manufacturer liable, there must be proof that
the manufacturer sold and delivered the food to the retailer. In Bilk v. Abbottr
Dairies, Inc., Is plaintiff brought an action of assumpsit against a manufacturer for
breach of warranty to recover for injuries caused by unwholesome milk. Plaintiff
testified he purchased the milk from a vendor who had handled defendant's milk
for several years, and that the bottle and cap had inscribed on them the name of defendant company, but there was no averment or proof that the defendant had sold
and delivered the bottle of milk in question to the dealer from whom plaintiff
made the purchase. The Superior Court sustained the entry of a nonsuit. Judge
Stadtfield, who wrote the opinion, distinguished this case from the Rozumailski
and Menaker cases, because those were in trespass. The decision seems wrong in
principal, because recovery should not be made to depend on the choice of form of
action. Here was a clear case of "original package", and to require proof of sale
and delivery by defendant to the retailer would appear to place an undue burden
on the injured and innocent plaintiff.
The Federal Courts sitting in Pennsylvania were originaly loath to impose
liability on vendors of deleterious food. In the first reported case 10 the Circuit
Court of Appeals held a vendor of food is not an insurer and refused to hold a
vendor liable without proof of negligence. The District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania refused to follow this decision, but followed the decision
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the Rozumailski case.20 This court continued
to follow the Pennsylvania decisions in a later case,2" on the authority of Erie R. R.
22
Co. v. Tompkins.
So far consideration has only been given to the liability of the manufacturer.
What is the liability of a retailer? Where the foreign substance gets into the food
through the negligence of the retailer, he will be liable.23 But what is his liability
IGNock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pgh. 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931);
v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Super. 76, 189 A. 714 (1937).
Menaker
7
l Werner v. Armour & Co., 320 Pa. 440, 183 A. 48 (1936).
18147 Pa. Super 39, 23A. 2d 342 ('1941).
19Horn & Hardart Baking Co. v. Lieber, 25F. 2d 449 (3 Cir., 1928).
20Quinn v. Swift & Co., 20F. Supp 234 (D.C., Mid.D.Pa. 1937) The injury was caused

by a piece of metal in a sausage encased in an unbroken skin. The Court applied the "original package rule".
21Newcomb v. Armour & Co., 39 F. Supp. 716 (D.C., Mid.D.Pa. 1941).
22304 U. S. 64
23McCabe v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 311 Pa. 229, 166 A. 843 (1933).
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when he purchascs from a manufaturer and resells in the original package food
later shown to be deleterious? The Supreme Court originally held 24 that the retailer would not be liable in an action of trespass for negligence, because he is not
required to analyze the contents of each package he receives and sells. In Ebbert v.
Philadelphia Electric Co.,2 5 an action of trespass against the vendor who was not
the manufacturer of a defective mechanical device, Mr. Justice Maxey (now Chief
Justice) said by way of dicta:
"It would, for example, be utterly impracticable and unreasonable to require grocers to open and analyze the contents of every can
of food they sell. The purchaser in such cases does not expect any
such precaution to be taken and relies wholly upon the integrity,
good faith and care of the person who put the food in the cans.
The rule of the nonliability of vendors in "original package" cases
is firmly established in the law." (italics by the Court)
Justice Maxey relied on Section 401 of the Restatement of the Law of Torts.
26
The comment on that section relates to sales at retail and says:

"Goods bought of retail or wholesale dealers in their original
packages and labelled as the product of the manufacturers are usually
bought in reliance upon the manufacturer's competence and care.
This is always the case where a purchaser asks for a particular brand.
Therefore, the retailer is not subject to liability for bodily harm
caused by their defective condition, unless the condition is such that
even the cursory inspection which a dealer should make of any
article, which he puts in stock and sells, would disclose some indication that the goods had deteriorated to a dangerous extent. On
the other hand, if the purchaser depends upon the recommendation
of the retailer, he is, entitled to expect that the retailer will know
something of the manufacturer of the goods he sells and will not
recommend the goods made by a manufacturer whom the retailer, by reputation or previous experience with his products, should
know to be careless or incompetent."
While this statement conforms to section 15 of the Sales Act, in that it makes
liability depend on reliance on the seller's skill or judgment, it is submitted that
it is too fine a distinction to have liability turn on the ground whether or not the
purchaser asks for the packaged goods under a brand name. Two customers may be
injured by the same product, one of them having purchased by brand name, and
the other not. The rights of these injured persons should not differ. Further, a
recent survey of the Committee of Consumer Relations in Advertising, Inc. shows
that only 12% of consumers think the best way to buy is to purchase advertised
brands, and that they have more confidence in the over-the-counter word of retail24

West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965, 53 LRA 329 (1901).
25330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
26
page 1088.
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ers.27 To distinguish cases of liability from non-liability on the ground of whether
the article was ordered by brand name is neither practical nor in accord with sound
reasoning.
Four years after the decision in the Ebbett case the Supreme Court took an
opposite view. In Bonenberger et al. v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co.28 plaintiff
brought an action of assumpsit against a retailer for injuries received from an
oyster shell contained in a pint of canned oysters. The lower Court gave binding
instructions for defendant, and the Supreme Court reversed and awarded a venire
jacias de novo. The report fails to show whether or not the oysters were ordered
by brand name, but the opinion indicates that this would be immaterial if the second clause of section 15 of the Sales Act,29 applies. The Court declined to discuss
how definite the description must be to bring it within this section. The Court
distinguished West v. EvianNel and Ebbeat v, Philadelphia Electric Co. on the
ground that they were in trespass for negligence, while the Bonenberger case was
in assumpsit for breach of warranty, and therefore the holdings of the tort cases
were not applicable. The Court was forced to this specious reasoning in order to
impose liability on a retailer of goods in the original package. But the Court went
on to say that the dealer is in a better position to know or ascertain the reliability
and responsibility of the packer than is the retail purchaser, and that the law will
place the responsibility on the party best able to recoup his loss.
In the Bonenberger case it was argued that the injury arose from a part of the
product sold as distinguished from a foreign substance or a noxious or impure
condition of the food itself, and that therefore the goods were reasonably fit for
human consumption as food and the defendant should not be liable as a matter of
law. The majority of the Court rejected this argument, and held that the question
of whether the food was fit for human consumption was for the jury.' 0
In cases where the deleterious food is procured from a restaurant, will the restaurateur be liable? If the action is brought on the theory of breach of warranty, there
is only a warranty in case of a sale. But when food is eaten in a restaurant, is there
a sale? The older authorities hold that where a customer orders a meal, title to the
food never passes.3' Where a customer orders and pays for a definite portion of
food, title probably passes. In Weil v. KatsaJanasH plaintiff ordered a pork sandwich from defendant. The sandwich proved deleterious, and plaintiff was injured
27

Time Magazine of May 26, 1947
28345 Pa. 359, 28 A. 2d 913, 143 A.L.R. 1917 (1943).
29
"Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that
description (whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty
that the goods shall be of merchantable quality."
8OTwo members of the Court (Patterson, J. and Schaffer, C. J.) dissented on this point.
81
See 1. Williston, Sales, Sec. 242b
82107 Pa. Superior 118, 162 A. 68 (1932).
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thereby. The question was raised whether the transaction constituted a sale. The
Superior Court concluded that it did, and in sustaining a verdict for plaintiff on
the theory of breach of an implied warranty said:
"Undoubtedly, if one purchases a sandwich, or piece of pie, or
other food, to be carried away and eaten, it constitutes a sale and the
seller is liable. To conclude that he is not subject to pay damages if
the food is eaten on the premisies, but if carried to the pavement and
there consumed, he is liable, is inconsistent and not in accord with
sound reasoning. The evil consequences in the one case are the same
as in the other. The attempt to establish a distinction as to liability
is not practicable."
It would thus appear that a restaurateur will be liable for injuries caused by deleterious food served by him regardless whether the food is served as a meal or by
the portion, or whether for consumption on or off of the premises where it is
served.
II
In bringing an action for injuries occasioned by deleterious food which form
of action should be chosen? We have seen that the actiont sounds either in tort for
negligence or in contract for breach of warranty. In an early Pennsylvania case, it
was held that an action of trespass on the case would not lie for breach of an implied covenant of warranty. 3 And where an action is brought on the theory of trespass rather than warranty, absence of negligence is a complete defense. 8 ' But
where the theory of the action is negligence it is not necessary to prove the particular dereliction, the mere presence of the foreign substance when in a sealed
container is sufficient, the accident proves its own negligence.15
There has been great conflict in the decisions concerning the proper form
of action. As late as 1931 the Superior Court said:5 6
"There is considerable confusion in the decisions as to the
theory of the liability of the defendant in this class of cases. Some
of them hold that an action is based upon negligence alone; others
that it may be founded on an implied warranty; and still others that
where an implied warranty exists, it does not extend to third parties.
Undoubtedly, an action in tort could have been brought, but in
SsErie City Iron Works. v. Barber & Co. 102 Pa. 156 (1883). This decision is not in accord
with the historical development of actions for breach of warranty. As Professor Williston points out
in his article "What Constitutes an Express Warranty in the Law of Sales", 21 Marv. L, Rev. 555,
"The law of warranty is older by a century than special assumpsit, and the action upon the case
on a warranty was one of the bases upon which the law of assumpsit seems to have been built.

The action on a warranty was regarded as an action of deceit, and thLwords "warrantizando
vendidit" seem to have been necessary to make a good count as the words "super se assumpsit"
later were in the action of assumpsit. The action on a warranty was thus conceived of at the outset
as an 4action of tort."
S Tavani v. Swift, 262 Pa. 184, 105 A.55 (1918)
8SRozumailski v. Phila. Coca Cola B. Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929)
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determining whether or not that form is exclusive, one is confronted
by a conflict of authorities which is confusing. The question whether
implied warranty
fitness;to etc.,
under ais,contract
an
the
so closelyofrelated
in manyof instances
mayassumpsit
be maintained
question of negligence that the decisions are not always susceptible
of clear classification. In 26 C.J. 783; it is stated that the general
rule is, that in all sales of food or beverage for immediate consumption by a dealer, there is an implied warranty of fitness or
wholesomeness for the consumer."
In Hendetson v. Nat. Drug Co it was held that an action against a druggist
to recover for personal injuries for a harmful drug should be ex dlictu rather than
ex contractu, except wvhere the suit is based on the breach of an express warranty 8
The Court appears to neglect section 15 of the Sales Act, and does not mention
it in its opinion. The Court distinguishes this case from the food cases, and holds
that in food cases it is immaterial whether the case is tried on a theory of negligence
or on the theory of breach of an implied warranty.
Jn Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co26pan9 the action was brought
in assumpsit for breach of warranty. The Court based the right to recover on the
that the buyer does rely on the
first clause of section 15 of the Sales Act, and
seller's skill or judgment, even where the subject of the sale is canned goods not
open to inspection by the dealer who is not thq manufacturer because the dealer is
in a better position to know or ascertain the reliabilit and responsibility of the
packer than is the purchaser. The law places the responsibility or the party best
able to recoup his losses. But the Court took this view because the action was in
assumpsit rather than in trespass, and held that the principles of the tort cases4 0
did not apply.
In Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 1 plaintiff brought an action in assuhpsit

against a bottler of milk to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have
been sustained by plaintiff from broken glass contained in a bottle of milk. Plaintiff
testified that he purchased the bottle of milk in question from a particular vendor
who had handled defendant's milk for severl years, and that the bottle and cap
had inscribed thereon the name of defendant company. There was no averment of
proof that the defendant company had sold and delivered the bottle of milk in
question to the dealer from whom plaintiff had made the purchase. In an endeavor
to prove this point plaintiff offered in evidence an allegation of his statement of
8

sNock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Superior 515

(1931)

87343 Pa. 601, 23 A. 2d 743 (1942).
siThe court followed the earlier case of West v. Emanuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965, 53 L.R.A.
329 (1901) which relates to. drugs. The Courts of other states take the opposite view e.g., Thomas
v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852); Blood Balm o. v. Cooper, 83 Ga. 457, 5
L.R.A. 612 (1889).
89

See note
v. 28.manuel, 198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965, 53 LR.A. 329, and
4oWest
Electric Company 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323.
1147 Pa. Superior Court 39, 23 A. 2d 342, (941).

bbert v. Philadelphia
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claim to which no affidavit of defense had been filed, averring that the bottle in
question had been prepared, manufactured and packed by defendant. An objection
to this offer was sustained. At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant moved
for a nonsuit. The lower Court granted the motion, and on appeal the Superior
Court affirmed. The Court held that although this action was brought in assumpsit,
it nevertheless sounded in tort, and that the provisions of the Practice Act42 relating to affidavits of defense in actions of tort are to be applied in so far as they
relate to the averments relied on to establish negligence and the damages claimed.
This decision appears to be wrong on the question of pleading. By failing to
file an affidavit of defense under section 13 of the Practice Act or an Answer under
Rule 1045 of the Rules of Civil Procedure defendant admits all averments relating
to the indentity of the person by whom a material act was committed, arid plaintiff
is entitled to have this undenied averment placed in evidence. 48
The existence of liability of defendant and plaintiff's right to recover should
not be made to depend on the form or theory of action. Whether the action is
brought in assumpsit for breach of warranty or in trespass for negligence, the
pleadings, proofs and right to recover should conform to the same standards. This
is particularly true in regard to the period of limitations within which an action
may be brought. The statute of limitations in contract cases is six years while the
period of limitations for tort actions for personal injuries is two year. 4 But an
action of assumpsit to recover consequential damages for breach of warranty
brought after two years have passed, will be banned because the gist of the action
is damages for personal injuries, although plaintiff would be entitled at least to
nominal damages for breach of contract and might recover the value of the article
4
sold. "
III
What measure of proof is required to establish a prima facie case of liability?
The Rozumailski case laid down the doctrine that in the case of a sealed container,
the mere presence of the foreign body in the container is sufficient to take the case
to the jury. It is for the jury to determine whether the foreign matter was in the food
at the time of the sale, and the question of defendant's negligence is for the jury.'4
Where from the facts it is apparent that the foreign substance was swallowed and
could not be successfully removed and therefore it would be impossible to state its
4

12

2
Act of May 14, 1915 P.L. 483, Section 13, as amended by the Act of April 4, 1929 P.L. 140;
P.S.,
Section 412.
8

4 Buehler v. U. S. Fashion Plate Co,, 269 Pa. 428, 112 A. 632 (1921); Lang y. Casey, 326

Pa. 193,
191 A. 586 (1937).
44 Act of 1713, 1 Sm.L. 36; Act of 1895 P.L. 236, Section 2; 12 P.S. Section 34.
i5Jones vs. Boggs & Buhl, 355 Pa. 242, 49 A. 2d 379, (1946)
4Madden v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 106 Pa. Superior 474, 162 A. 687 (1932) ; Nock v. Coca
Cola Bot, Wks., 102 Pa. Superior 515, 156 A. 537 (1931); Levy v. Horn & Hardart Bkg. Co.,
103 Pa. Superior 282, 157 A. 369 (1931); Campbell v. G. C. Murphy Co., 122 Pa. Superior 342,
186 A. 269 (1936).
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exact nature, the nature thereof need not be alleged or proved. 47 But it is necessary
to prove that the injuries resulted from eating contaminated food, and that it was
contaminated at the time of purchase,48 although the burden is not upon plaintiff
to prove that the foreign substance is highly poisonous. The test is whether the
proof is such to satisfy a reasonable and well balanced mind that plaintiff was
harmed by the negligence of defendant; it is not necessary for plaintiff to exclude
every other cause of the change in his physical condition which might have pro.
4
duced or contributed to it. 0
On the other hand, what type of evidence may a defendant offer in defense? He
may present evidence of the method of manufacture and the care used, for although
due care is not a defense, there is no other way to controvert the charge that the
food contained a foreign substance or that there was a breath of warranty. 5
What is the measure of damages which may be recovered? In actions for
breach of warranty, it is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary
course of events, from the breach of warranty.51 But the injuries must occur from
the actual ingestion of the deleterious food, and result from physical and not from
psychic causes.6 2 The injury must be due to the noxious character of the food itself,
and not be caused by some allergy or individual idiosyncracy on the part of the
injured person. A vendor does not warrant that although the product is harmless
to practically all the public, it does not contain any substance or ingredients that
may injuriously affect some individual purchaser who has a peculiar susceptibility
53
unknown to the vendor.

IV
In an action based on breach of warranty, the defense is sometimes raised that
the action cannot be maintained because there is no privity of contract between the
parties. In cases where the manufacturer or processer is the defendant, there is rarely if ever any privity of contract between him and the injured plaintiff. While
a manufacturer will not ordinarily be liable to those with whom he has no contractual relationship, if he puts goods upon the market in a bottle, can or original
package, he in effect represents to each purchaser that the contents thereof are
wholesome and suitable for the purpose for which they are sold. The purchaser
has the right to rely upon the assurance of the manufacturer that the contents are
47Murphy v." Yuengling Dairy Products Corp., 34 D.&C. 355 (C.P. Schuylkill 1938)

48Taylor, Adms. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 48 D. & C, 687 (C.P. No. 3, Phila., 1943).
49 Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., of Pa. 152 Pa. Superior 445, 33 A. 2d 488 (1943).
60Canterman v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 55 D.&C. 175 (C.P. Adams, 1945).
5

lAct

of May 19, 1915 P.L. 543 (Uniform Sales Act), section 69, 69 P.S. Section 314; West

v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Superior 1.18, 162 A. 685; Campbell v. G. C. Murphy C., 122 Pa. Superior
342, 6 186A.
269 (1936).
2
Menaker v. Supplee-Wills-Jones Milk Co., 125 Pa. Superior 76, 189 A. 714 (1937); Koplin
v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 22 D. & C. 442, 119 Pa. Superior 528, 181'A. 381, 322 Pa. 333, 185 A.

(1936); Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp. 1018 (D.C., W.D. Pa., 1936); Martin
v. Walgreen Co., 4 Fay L.J. 10.
6SBarrett v. S.S. Kresge Co., 144 Pa. Superior 516, 19 A. 2d 526 (1941).
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fit and wholesome, and it is only just and reasonable to hold him responsible. In
such cases, the common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not prevail.5 4 But
in Bonenberger vs. Pittsburgh Mercanlile Co. 5 the Supreme Court did not pass on
the question of privity of contract, since the case was sent back for retrial, and
the facts concerning the purchase would appear at the time. Of course, the warranty of the manufacturer will not run to the purchaser or consumer where the
food is sold loose and not in the original package and where the purchaser has an
opportunity to examine it. 56
In cases where the retailer is the defendant, there is more likely to be privity of
contract. But in some cases the injured party is not the purchaser. It has been
suggested that although the warranty of the manufacturer runs to the ultimate consumer, the warranty of thc seller runs only to the immediate purchaser.57 It is
submitted that this distinction is without foundation in logic, and was not adopted
by the Supreme Court in the Bonenberger case.6 s The courts have been astute to
answer the objection of lack of privity by holding that the purchaser is presumed
to be the agent of the injured party, 50 or that the warranty is in the nature of a con61
tract for the benefit of a third party.6 0 It appears, as Judge Cardozo once remarked,
I'the assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in the days apace,"
and the
courts do not give much support to this defense.
V
The foregoing cases referred to in this study illustrate the natural growth of
the law from our court decisions as affected by the Pennsylvania Act of 188962
and the Uniform Sales Act. The decisional standards for determining whether liability shall be imposed must necessarily be altered to adapt them to the changing
conditions of modern merchandising of food and food products. The courts are
well aware that the day is long past when the processer of food furnishes it directly
to the consumer, and know that there is usually a long chain of distribution
between the grower or manufacturer and the ultimate consumer. It is thus that
what Professor Williston refers to as "that good old doctrine for the encouragement of trade known as caveat emptor"63 has, in cases involving injury from
unwholesome food, given way to a liability based upon the broader concept of what
64
Mr. Justice Frazer has called "The demands of social justice."
54Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pgh., 102 Pa. Superior 515 A.- 537 (1931).
65345 Pa. 559, 563, 28A. 2d 913 (1942).
56Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pgh., 102 Pa. Superior 515, 156A. 537 (1931).
67 Mizikowski, v. Armour & Co., 33 Luzerne Leg. Reg. 421 (1934).
58
See note 59.
59Young v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 15 F. Supp 1018 (D.C., W.D. P., 1936).
S0oSimon v. John J. Felin & Co., 35 D. & C. 645, 648 (1939).
OlUltramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180 (1931).
62See note 4.
6827 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 13.
64Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915).

